The Generality of Particular Thought
The Generality of Particular Thought
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10691568 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Imogen Dickie (0000-0001-9346-643X, New York University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 240 |
| Pages | 508-531 |
| Publication date | 2009-07-08 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.629.x |
| OpenAlex | W1874419767 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
Argues against a strong version of Evans's generality constraint, and for a weak version. This paper is about the claim that, necessarily, a subject who can think that a is F must also have the capacities to think that a is G, a is H, a is I, and so on (for some reasonable range of G, H, I), and that b is F, c is F, d is F, and so on (for some reasonable range of b, c, d). I set out, and raise objections to, two arguments for a strong version of this claim (Gareth Evans' generality constraint). I present a new argument for a weaker version of the claim, and sketch some directions of enquiry which this new argument opens up
Art · Art history · Epistemology · Generality · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2018 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |