High Accessibility and Justification

On a certain view of knowledge, one knows p only if one is justified in believing p, and to know or to be justified in believing something is to be in an epistemic state of a certain sort. Many philosophers have held we can know or be justified in believing we are in such states but disagree over what is required for a person to know or to be justified in believing he is in such an epistemic state. However, some philosophers have agreed with the view expressed by H. A. Prichard in Knowledge and Perception, Whenever we know something, we either do, or at least can, by reflecting directly know we are knowing it.' This view is an example of what William Alston has called the High Accessibility position. It is the view that epistemic states are, in one way or another, readily accessible to their possessor.' In this paper I defend the high accessibility of our epistemic states against some recent criticisms. In the first section I consider one view, suggested by Alston, concerning what is required for justified beliefs about evaluative states in general. Our epistemic states are often taken to be evaluative states and if Alston's view is correct, then we have good grounds for doubting our epistemic states are highly accessible. I argue Alston's view presupposes two theses, neither of which is clearly true. In the second section, I shall present two arguments in favor of the high accessibility of justification. One of these arguments has been advanced by Carl Ginet and criticized by Alston. While Ginet's argument can meet Alston's objections, I argue it faces other problems

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

• Epistemic Supervenience and Internalism

  Open Access•COLIN RULOFF, Colin P Ruloff•Theoria•2009

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