Epistemic Supervenience and Internalism
A Trilemma
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142853 |
|---|---|
| Authors | COLIN RULOFF, Colin P Ruloff (Kwantlen Polytechnic University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 129-151 |
| Publication date | 2009-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2009.01037.x |
| OpenAlex | W2058766829 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
Epistemic Internalism (EI) is the claim that an agent S is justified in believing that p at a time t iff S has either an actual or potential direct awareness of the grounds or properties that confer justification on p at t . In this paper I argue that EI does not provide the proponent of EI with an intuitively clear analysis of epistemic justification. More exactly, after identifying two different versions of EI – a weak version and a strong version – I offer some general considerations for thinking that neither the weak version nor the strong version provides the proponent of EI with a plausible analysis of epistemic justification and conclude, therefore, that EI itself cannot be considered a plausible analysis of epistemic justification
Economics · Epistemology · Internalism and externalism · Metaphysics · Supervenience · Trilemma · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Justification without Awareness
We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now
Doubt, Circularity and the Moorean Response to the Sceptic
High Accessibility and Justification
An Argument That Internalism Requires Infallibility
On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification
On Being Epistemically Internal
| Highly cited | No |
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