Can There Be Full Excuses for Morally Wrong Actions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10352147 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eduardo Rivera‐López (0000-0003-0071-8189, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 73 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 124-142 |
| Publication date | 2006-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00607.x |
| OpenAlex | W2065494850 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 5 |
Most people (and philosophers) distinguish between performing a morally wrong action and being blameworthy for having performed that action, and believe that an individual can be fully excused for having performed a wrong action. My purpose is to reject this claim. More precisely, I defend what I call the “Dependence Claim”: A's doing X is wrong only if A is blameworthy for having done X. I consider three cases in which, according to the traditional view, a wrong action could be excused: duress, mental illness, and mistake. I try to show that the reasons for excusing in either case are not relevantly distinguishable from the reasons for claiming that the prima facie wrong action is not wrong all things considered
Action (physics · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Mistake · Physics · Political science · Prima facie · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Torture, Ethics, and Law · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2024 (11) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |