What Kind of Ignorance Excuses? Two Neglected Issues

Bibliographic Data

ID4351189
AuthorsRafael Peels (0000-0001-8107-5992, Amsterdam UMC Location Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, corresponding author)
Year2014
Volume64
Issue256
Pages478-496
Publication date2014-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqu013
OpenAlexW1992008230
LanguageEN
Citations received17
References cited27

The philosophical literature displays a lively debate on the conditions under which ignorance excuses. In this paper, I formulate and defend an answer to two questions that have not yet been discussed in the literature on exculpatory ignorance. First, which kinds of propositional attitudes that count as ignorance provide an excuse? I argue that we need to consider four options here: having a false belief, suspending judgement on a true proposition, being deeply ignorant of a truth, and having a true belief that falls short of knowledge. Secondly, ignorance of which propositions counts as an excuse? I discuss four candidates: ignorance of one's obligation, ignorance that one is able to meet that obligation, ignorance of how to meet that obligation, and lack of foresight regarding that obligation. I argue that we can give a satisfactory account of exculpatory ignorance only if we pay attention to these two neglected issues.

Epistemology · Excuse · Ignorance · Judgement · Law and economics · Obligation · Political science · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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