Objective Being and “Ofness” in Descartes

Bibliographic Data

ID10352347
AuthorsLionel Shapiro (0000-0002-9155-2331, University of Connecticut, corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume84
Issue2
Pages378-418
Publication date2011-01-12
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00475.x
OpenAlexW2144913758
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited24

It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes “objective being in the intellect” in order to explain or describe an idea’s status as being “of something.” I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of “materially false ideas” in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of ‘idea of’. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can’t be introducing objective being to explain or describe “ofness” understood in this sense. Descartes also appeals to a pretheoretical sense of ‘idea of’. I will argue that the notion of objective being can’t serve to explain or describe this “ofness” either. I conclude by proposing an alternative explanation of the role of objective being, according to which Descartes introduces this notion to explain the mind’s ability to attain clear and distinct ideas

Epistemology · Intellect · Metaphysics · Order (exchange · Philosophy of mind · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

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