Lionel Shapiro
Biographic Data
| ID | 441055 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lionel Shapiro |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lionel |
| FAMILY NAME | Shapiro |
| SIGNATURE | SHAPIRO L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Connecticut |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9155-2331 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Truth’s dialectical role
This paper contrasts two versions of a pragmatist critique of deflationism about truth. According to the critique, understanding the practice of factual discourse requires understanding a role played in that practice by speakers’ use of the concept of truth. Huw Price takes this role to lie in the expression of attitudes of approval and disapproval toward other speakers’ assertions. I explain why this account fails to yield Price’s key anti-defla…
Global expressivism as global subjectivism
What is logical deflationism? Two non-metalinguistic conceptions of logic
The very idea of a substructural approach to paradox
Linguistic Function and Content
Huw Price proposes a strategy for dissolving ontological puzzles through a pragmatist account of our conceptual activity. Here I consider the proper place for conceptual content in Price's pragmatism. Price himself rules out any explanatory role for content, just as he rules out any explanatory role for representational notions such as reference and truth. I argue that the cases are disanalogous and that he offers no good reasons for avoiding exp…
Objective Being and “Ofness” in Descartes
It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes “objective being in the intellect” in order to explain or describe an idea’s status as being “of something.” I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of “materially false ideas” in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of ‘idea of’. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can’t be introducing objective bei…
Deflating Logical Consequence
Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an altern…
Between Saying and Doing
Brandom, Robert B., Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 240, £18.99 (cloth). A central thesis of Robert Brandom's treatise Making It
Naïve Truth-Conditions and Meaning
Critics of attempts to explain meaning in terms of truth‐conditions have tended to charge their opponents with misconceptions regarding truth. I shall argue that the ‘naïve’ version of the truth‐conditional theory which best accounts for its resilience fails for a different and more basic reason, namely, circularity arising from the contingency of meaning. One reason why this problem has been overlooked is a tendency (noted by Dummett in a differ…
Brandom on the Normativity of Meaning
Brandom's “inferentialism”–his theory that an expression's or state's contentfulness consists in its use or occurrence being governed by inferential norms–proves dubiously compatible with his own deflationary approach to underwriting the objectivity of intentional content (an approach that is one of the theory's essential presuppositions). This is because a deflationist argument, adapted from the case of truth to that of correct inference , under…
Deflating Logical Consequence
Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an altern…
Brandom on the Normativity of Meaning
Brandom's “inferentialism”–his theory that an expression's or state's contentfulness consists in its use or occurrence being governed by inferential norms–proves dubiously compatible with his own deflationary approach to underwriting the objectivity of intentional content (an approach that is one of the theory's essential presuppositions). This is because a deflationist argument, adapted from the case of truth to that of correct inference , under…
The very idea of a substructural approach to paradox
Linguistic Function and Content
Huw Price proposes a strategy for dissolving ontological puzzles through a pragmatist account of our conceptual activity. Here I consider the proper place for conceptual content in Price's pragmatism. Price himself rules out any explanatory role for content, just as he rules out any explanatory role for representational notions such as reference and truth. I argue that the cases are disanalogous and that he offers no good reasons for avoiding exp…
Between Saying and Doing
Brandom, Robert B., Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 240, £18.99 (cloth). A central thesis of Robert Brandom's treatise Making It
Brandom on the Normativity of Meaning
Brandom's “inferentialism”–his theory that an expression's or state's contentfulness consists in its use or occurrence being governed by inferential norms–proves dubiously compatible with his own deflationary approach to underwriting the objectivity of intentional content (an approach that is one of the theory's essential presuppositions). This is because a deflationist argument, adapted from the case of truth to that of correct inference , under…
Naïve Truth-Conditions and Meaning
Critics of attempts to explain meaning in terms of truth‐conditions have tended to charge their opponents with misconceptions regarding truth. I shall argue that the ‘naïve’ version of the truth‐conditional theory which best accounts for its resilience fails for a different and more basic reason, namely, circularity arising from the contingency of meaning. One reason why this problem has been overlooked is a tendency (noted by Dummett in a differ…
Between Saying and Doing
Brandom, Robert B., Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 240, £18.99 (cloth). A central thesis of Robert Brandom's treatise Making It
Objective Being and “Ofness” in Descartes
It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes “objective being in the intellect” in order to explain or describe an idea’s status as being “of something.” I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of “materially false ideas” in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of ‘idea of’. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can’t be introducing objective bei…
Deflating Logical Consequence
Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an altern…
Linguistic Function and Content
Huw Price proposes a strategy for dissolving ontological puzzles through a pragmatist account of our conceptual activity. Here I consider the proper place for conceptual content in Price's pragmatism. Price himself rules out any explanatory role for content, just as he rules out any explanatory role for representational notions such as reference and truth. I argue that the cases are disanalogous and that he offers no good reasons for avoiding exp…
The very idea of a substructural approach to paradox
Global expressivism as global subjectivism
What is logical deflationism? Two non-metalinguistic conceptions of logic
Truth’s dialectical role
This paper contrasts two versions of a pragmatist critique of deflationism about truth. According to the critique, understanding the practice of factual discourse requires understanding a role played in that practice by speakers’ use of the concept of truth. Huw Price takes this role to lie in the expression of attitudes of approval and disapproval toward other speakers’ assertions. I explain why this account fails to yield Price’s key anti-defla…
Epistemology (10 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education (4 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works)