Deflating Logical Consequence

Deflating Logical Consequence

Bibliographic Data

ID5350971
AuthorsLionel Shapiro (0000-0002-9155-2331, University of Connecticut, corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume61
Issue243
Pages320-342
Publication date2011-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.678.x
OpenAlexW1839732781
LanguageEN
Citations received9

Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an alternative to model‐theoretic or proof‐theoretic accounts of consequence's nature. I then argue, against considerations put forward by Field and Beall, that Curry's paradox no more rules out deflationism about consequence than the liar paradox rules out deflationism about truth

Coherence theory of truth · Epistemology · Generality · Logical truth · Pragmatic theory of truth · Predicate (mathematical logic) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

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