Fake News, Epistemic Coverage and Trust

Bibliographic Data

ID10360698
AuthorsSarah Ryan (0000-0001-9368-0049, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume92
Issue4
Pages606-612
Publication date2021-05-08
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Political Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0032-3179 • E-ISSN: 1467-923X
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1467-923x.13003
OpenAlexW3160220812
LanguageEN
Citations received8

This article makes the case that a deficit or absence of trust in media sources to report on newsworthy items facilitates acceptance of fake news. The article begins by identifying the sort of fake news that is of interest for the purposes of this article. Epistemic coverage is then explained—in particular, how an individual's expectations about their epistemic environment can lead them to accepting or rejecting claims. The article explains that when an individual believes that mainstream media report on what is deemed newsworthy, it follows that an individual will have grounds to dismiss a newsworthy claim that has not been reported upon—such as a claim made by fake news. Trust—which has both a believed competence requirement and a believed goodwill requirement—is then discussed as part of this explanation. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the argument for regulating mainstream media

Argument (complex analysis · Business · Competence (human resources · Epistemology · Goodwill · Mainstream · Political science · Sociology · sort · Accounting · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Hate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection · Law · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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