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Fake news and epistemic flooding

Bibliographic Data

ID10815325
AuthorsGlenn Anderau (0000-0003-4736-1922, University of Zurich, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume202
Issue4
Publication date2023-09-24
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSynthese (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-023-04336-7
OpenAlexW4386998152
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited26

The advance of the internet and social media has had a drastic impact on our epistemic environment. This paper will focus on two different risks epistemic agents face online: being exposed to fake news and epistemic flooding. While the first risk is widely known and has been extensively discussed in the philosophical literature, the notion of ‘epistemic flooding’ is a novel concept introduced in this paper. Epistemic flooding occurs when epistemic agents find themselves in epistemic environments in which they are routinely confronted with more information and evidence than they can diligently process. Epistemic flooding is one of the most significant risks epistemic agents run while using social media and one of the reasons why the first risk (being exposed to fake news) is especially pernicious. It is particularly harmful if one ascribes to the Spinozan model of belief acquisition in which belief comes easy. Mitigating the combined threat of fake news and epistemic flooding requires us to think normatively about our epistemic environments and how to better them. This paper turns to the normative framework of epistemic environmentalism in order to accomplish this

Epistemic virtue · Epistemology · Focus (optics) · Metaphysics · Normative · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Social epistemology · Sociology · Uncertainty quantification · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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    Sean Hermanson, Murray Clarke•Social Epistemology•2025

  • Journalism and public trust in science

    Open Access•Vanessa Schipani•Synthese•2024

  • Alief in Action (and Reaction)

    Open Access•Tamar Szabó Gendler•Mind & Language•2008

  • Fake News and Partisan Epistemology

    Regina Rini•Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal•2017

  • Thinking is Believing

    Eric Mandelbaum•Inquiry•2014

  • Information overload and fake news sharing

    Open Access•Alena Bermes•Journal of Retailing and Consumer…•2021

  • Stop talking about fake news!

    Joshua Habgood-Coote•Inquiry•2019

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    Open Access•N Levy•Social Epistemology•2022

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    Christopher Blake‐turner•Inquiry•2025

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    Joshua Habgood-Coote•Inquiry•2022

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    Bennett Holman, Sven Bernecker et al.•Epistemology of Fake News•2021

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    Open Access•C Thi Nguyen•EPISTÉMÈ•2018

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    Open Access•Axel Gelfert•Informal Logic•2018

  • Post-Truth

    Lee Mcintyre, Lee C Mcintyre•Post-Truth•2018

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    Open Access•Keith Raymond Harris•Philosophy & Technology•2022

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    Open Access•Eliot Michaelson, Rachel Katharine Sterken et al.•Journal of Ethics and Social…•2019

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    Open Access•Bruno Whittle•Philosophical Perspectives•2012

  • Why do so few people share fake news? It hurts their reputation

    Open Access•Sacha Altay, Anne-Sophie Hacquin et al.•New Media & Society•2020

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  • How mental systems believe

    Daniel T Gilbert•American Psychologist•1991

  • You can't not believe everything you read

    Daniel T Gilbert, Romin W Tafarodi et al.•Journal of Personality and Social…•1993

Citations per year2
Citation span2024 - 2026 (3)
Highly citedNo

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