You can't not believe everything you read

Bibliographic Data

ID6207110
AuthorsDaniel T Gilbert (0000-0002-9865-4445, The University of Texas at Austin, corresponding author), Romin W Tafarodi (0000-0001-5006-1379), Patrick S Malone, Patrick Malone (0000-0002-8364-6987)
Year1993
Volume65
Issue2
Pages221-233
Publication date1993-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Personality and Social Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3514 • E-ISSN: 1939-1315
PublisherAmerican Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1037//0022-3514.65.2.221
PMID8366418
OpenAlexW2141306428
LanguageEN
Citations received207
References cited4

Can people comprehend assertions without believing them? Descartes (1644/1984) suggested that people can and should, whereas Spinoza (1677/1982) suggested that people should but cannot. Three experiments support the hypothesis that comprehension includes an initial belief in the information comprehended. Ss were exposed to false information about a criminal defendant (Experiments 1 and 2) or a college student (Experiment 3). Some Ss were exposed to this information while under load (Experiments 1 and 2) or time pressure (Experiment 3). Ss made judgments about the target (sentencing decisions or liking judgments). Both load and time pressure caused Ss to believe the false information and to use it in making consequential decisions about the target. In Spinozan terms, both manipulations prevented Ss from "unbelieving" the false information they automatically believed during comprehension.

Cognitive psychology · Comprehension · Linguistics · Deception detection and forensic psychology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy · Psychology · Reflective Practices in Education · Social Psychology

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