Bad Education

Pity, Moral Learning, and the Limits of Rousseauan Friendship

Bibliographic Data

ID10433282
AuthorsJohn Warner (0000-0002-6030-0043, corresponding author)
Year2014
Volume76
Issue2
Pages243-266
Publication date2014-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Review of Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0034-6705 • E-ISSN: 1748-6858
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0034670514000072
OpenAlexW2106135463
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited11

Despite a recent resurgence of interest in friendship and a seemingly inexhaustible fascination with Rousseau, scholars have neglected Rousseau's conception of friendship. The work that does exist emphasizes friendship's ability to inculcate virtue, and moors Rousseau to the classical notion that friendship catalyzes ethical improvement. However, Rousseau lowers the aim of friendship by decoupling it from the process of moral learning and putting limits on the degree of intimacy between friends. The argument is made in four steps. First, Rousseau's theory of friendship differs from its relevant predecessors in both origin and end. Second, the effort to ground friendship in pity bounds emotional intimacy, since pity introduces elements of character difference as well as sameness. Third, Rousseauan friendship fails to catalyze virtue and is successful instead in providing consolation. Finally, the essay considers the function of friendship in a Rousseauan polity

Epistemology · Friendship · Pity · Sociology · Virtue · Philosophy · Political Theory and Influence · Psychology · Religion, Gender, and Enlightenment · Rousseau and Enlightenment Thought · Social Psychology

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