Fiscal Indulgence in Central Europe
Loss of the External Anchor
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10492691 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Helge Berger (Freie Universität Berlin, corresponding author), George Kopits (Hungarian National Bank), Istvan P Szekely (0000-0003-4734-6597, International Monetary Fund) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 116-135 |
| Publication date | 2007-01-24 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Scottish Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0036-9292 • E-ISSN: 1467-9485 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2007.00407.x |
| OpenAlex | W2007645141 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
In recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries on the path to European Union (EU) accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game‐theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimes – allowing for regime shifts – depending on country characteristics and EU policies
Accession · Convergence (economics · Economics · European union · Fiscal policy · Incentive · Indulgence · International economics · Macroeconomics · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Political science · Position (finance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
| Highly cited | No |
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