Valuing, Desiring and Normative Priority
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10690381 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael S Brady (0000-0001-5826-7136, University of Stirling, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 211 |
| Pages | 231-242 |
| Publication date | 2003-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00308 |
| OpenAlex | W2025278744 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 5 |
Judgement internalism claims that our evaluative judgements will motivate us to act appropriately, at least in so far as we are rational. I examine how this claim should be understood, with particular focus on whether valuing enjoys a kind of 'normative priority' over desiring. I consider and reject views according to which valuing something provides one with a reason to be moved; this claim of normative priority and the readings of internalism it suggests are too strong. I also reject an interpretation which eschews claims of normative priority, whilst maintaining that valuing nevertheless rationally commits or requires one to be motivated; this rejection of normative priority and the reading of internalism it supports are too weak. In the final sections I sketch the understanding of judgement internalism I favour, and defend it against objections
Epistemology · Internalism and externalism · Interpretation (philosophy) · Judgement · Linguistics · Normative · Sketch · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |