Krinostic Injustice
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10691121 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Linh Mac (0000-0002-3116-9437, Le Moyne College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1388-1409 |
| Publication date | 2025-10-15 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqaf089 |
| OpenAlex | W4414528641 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 26 |
This paper articulates a kind of epistemic injustice in respect of judgement. I dub it ‘krinostic injustice’ (in Ancient Greek, the verb κρίνω means ‘to decide’). It illuminates a phenomenon in which a hearer believes a speaker’s testimonies insofar as they constitute what I call ‘basic’ reports, such as recollections of a series of events, but disbelieves the speaker’s testimony concerning the characterisation of their experience. To motivate the distinction between basic reports and characterisations, I examine a lawyer’s cross-examination of a complainant in a sexual assault case. I then explain when a hearer’s disbelief of a speaker’s interpretative report can constitute krinostic injustice. Finally, I consider objections to my view
Economic Justice · Injustice · Phenomenon · Plaintiff · Verb · Critical Race Theory in Education · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Political Philosophy and Ethics
Epistemic Injustice and the Preservation of Ignorance
Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as Hermeneutical Injustices
The World Observed/The World Conceived
Banal Skepticism and the Errors of Doubt
Epistemic injustice and deepened disagreement
A Cautionary Tale
The Epistemology of Resistance
Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons
One Too Many
Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice
Hermeneutical Injustice
Just The Facts
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |