The Problem with Reid's Direct Realism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10691286 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J Todd Buras (Yale University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 209 |
| Pages | 457-477 |
| Publication date | 2002-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00280 |
| OpenAlex | W2084905915 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 8 |
There is a problem about the compatibility of Reid's commitment to both a sign theory of sensations and also direct realism. I show that Reid is committed to three different senses of the claim that mind‐independent bodies and their qualities are among the immediate objects of perception, and I then argue that Reid's sign theory conflicts with one of these. I conclude by advocating one proposal for reconciling Reid's claims, deferring a thorough development and defence of the proposal to another paper
Direct and indirect realism · Epistemology · Perception · Realism · Sign (mathematics) · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2014 (5) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |