A zetetic approach to perspectivism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10691878 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Inken Titz (0009-0000-6951-1384, Ruhr University Bochum, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Publication date | 2025-03-27 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqaf025 |
| OpenAlex | W4409033417 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 42 |
According to perspectivism, what I ought to do depends on my perspective. While recently popular, perspectivism faces a central puzzle. In some deliberative practices, facts outside our perspective are clearly relevant. In deliberation, we are concerned with acquiring new information. In advising, a better-informed adviser possesses relevant information I do not have. The latter case distinctly highlights the challenge: even if you possess better information than me, if your advice is not supported by my available reasons, it is wrong. In this paper, I argue that this puzzle can be solved by a zetetic approach to perspectivism. To that aim, I introduce close reasons, which are facts knowable under specific bounded conditions that can be inferred from intuitive assumptions about inquiry. They can explain the directedness of deliberation and how better-informed advisers speak truly given perspectivism. This paper brings together the hitherto separate debates about reasons perspectivism and zetetic norms
Epistemology · Perspectivism · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychological and Educational Research Studies
Living with Uncertainty
The Importance of Being Rational
Having reasons
Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection
Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence
How To Do Things With Words
The Domain of Reasons
Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion
Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering
Inquiry and the epistemic
Should epistemology take the zetetic turn
Perspectivism, Accessibility and the Failure of Conjunction Agglomeration
Objectivism and Prospectivism About Rightness
"Ought" and the Perspective of the Agent
On what matters, Volume one
It's the Thought that Counts
The Epistemic and the Zetetic
Deliberation and Acting for Reasons
On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology
Curiosity was Framed
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat
Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality
The Ethics of Belief
Theory of inquiry
Normative Reasons Contextualism
Moral Dimensions
The Normativity of Rationality
Ifs and Oughts
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |