Truth and Other Self-Effacing Properties
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10692219 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Chase B Wrenn (0000-0002-1534-8945, University of Alabama, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 217 |
| Pages | 577-586 |
| Publication date | 2004-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00374.x |
| OpenAlex | W2101209485 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 4 |
A ‘self‐effacing’ property is one that is definable without referring to it. Colin McGinn has argued that there is exactly one such property: truth. I show that if truth is a self‐effacing property, then there are very many others — too many even to constitute a set
Epistemology · Programming language · Property (philosophy) · Set (abstract data type) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Highly cited | No |
|---|