Chase B Wrenn
Biographic Data
| ID | 1629096 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Chase B Wrenn |
| GIVEN NAMES | Chase B |
| FAMILY NAME | Wrenn |
| SIGNATURE | WRENN C B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Alabama |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1534-8945 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 13 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Reconciling Deflationism and Satisfaction Semantics
Deflating the Success-Truth Connection
According to a prominent objection, deflationist theories of truth can’t account for the explanatory connection between true belief and successful action [Putnam 1978 Putnam, Hilary 1978. Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. [Google Scholar]]. Canonical responses to the objection show how to reformulate truth-involving explanations of particular successful actions, so as to omit any mention of truth [Horwich 1998 Horwic…
Blindspots and brightspots for alethic pluralism
Alethic Pluralism and Logical Form
According to strong pluralist theories of truth, ‘true’ designates different properties depending on which sentences it is applied to. An influential objection to strong pluralism claims it cannot make sense of logically complex sentences whose components have different truth properties. For example, if ‘true’ designates correspondence for ‘Tabby is a cat’, and it designates coherence for ‘Tabby is beautiful’, what does it designate for ‘Tabby is…
Practical success and the nature of truth
Why There Are No Epistemic Duties
Epistemic duties would be duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, and they would be grounded in purely evidential considerations. I offer a new argument for the claim that there are no epistemic duties. Though people may have duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, those duties are never grounded in purely epistemic considerations. Rather, allegedly epistemic duties are a species of …
Epistemology as Engineering
According to a common objection to epistemological naturalism, no empirical, scientific theory of knowledge can be normative in the way epistemological theories need to be. In response, such naturalists as W.V. Quine have claimed naturalized epistemology can be normative by emulating engineering disciplines and addressing the relations of causal efficacy between our cognitive means and ends. This paper evaluates that “engineering reply” and finds…
Truth and Other Self-Effacing Properties
A ‘self‐effacing’ property is one that is definable without referring to it. Colin McGinn has argued that there is exactly one such property: truth. I show that if truth is a self‐effacing property, then there are very many others — too many even to constitute a set
Why There Are No Epistemic Duties
Epistemic duties would be duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, and they would be grounded in purely evidential considerations. I offer a new argument for the claim that there are no epistemic duties. Though people may have duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, those duties are never grounded in purely epistemic considerations. Rather, allegedly epistemic duties are a species of …
Truth and Other Self-Effacing Properties
A ‘self‐effacing’ property is one that is definable without referring to it. Colin McGinn has argued that there is exactly one such property: truth. I show that if truth is a self‐effacing property, then there are very many others — too many even to constitute a set
Epistemology as Engineering
According to a common objection to epistemological naturalism, no empirical, scientific theory of knowledge can be normative in the way epistemological theories need to be. In response, such naturalists as W.V. Quine have claimed naturalized epistemology can be normative by emulating engineering disciplines and addressing the relations of causal efficacy between our cognitive means and ends. This paper evaluates that “engineering reply” and finds…
Why There Are No Epistemic Duties
Epistemic duties would be duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, and they would be grounded in purely evidential considerations. I offer a new argument for the claim that there are no epistemic duties. Though people may have duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, those duties are never grounded in purely epistemic considerations. Rather, allegedly epistemic duties are a species of …
Practical success and the nature of truth
Alethic Pluralism and Logical Form
According to strong pluralist theories of truth, ‘true’ designates different properties depending on which sentences it is applied to. An influential objection to strong pluralism claims it cannot make sense of logically complex sentences whose components have different truth properties. For example, if ‘true’ designates correspondence for ‘Tabby is a cat’, and it designates coherence for ‘Tabby is beautiful’, what does it designate for ‘Tabby is…
Deflating the Success-Truth Connection
According to a prominent objection, deflationist theories of truth can’t account for the explanatory connection between true belief and successful action [Putnam 1978 Putnam, Hilary 1978. Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. [Google Scholar]]. Canonical responses to the objection show how to reformulate truth-involving explanations of particular successful actions, so as to omit any mention of truth [Horwich 1998 Horwic…
Blindspots and brightspots for alethic pluralism
Reconciling Deflationism and Satisfaction Semantics
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (8 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Normative (2 works)