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Alethic Pluralism and Logical Form

Bibliographic Data

ID21395173
AuthorsChase B Wrenn (0000-0002-1534-8945, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume59
Issue2
Pages249-265
Publication date2021-06-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Southern Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0038-4283 • E-ISSN: 2041-6962
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/sjp.12388
OpenAlexW3096918700
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited11

According to strong pluralist theories of truth, ‘true’ designates different properties depending on which sentences it is applied to. An influential objection to strong pluralism claims it cannot make sense of logically complex sentences whose components have different truth properties. For example, if ‘true’ designates correspondence for ‘Tabby is a cat’, and it designates coherence for ‘Tabby is beautiful’, what does it designate for ‘Tabby is a beautiful cat’ (Tappolet, Analysis , 57, 209–10, 1997)? Will Gamester ( Analysis , 79, 34–43, 2019) has proposed a novel pluralist theory meant to avoid the problem. The theory construes ‘true’ as designating a different property for each possible logical structure, and he has challenged monists to identify shortcomings of the theory in virtue of its pluralism. This paper answers Gamester’s challenge and identifies three such shortcomings. (1) The theory cannot make sense of the idea that all true conjunctions share the property of having true conjuncts , in virtue of which they are true. (2) The theory imposes unmotivated syntactic constraints on the language in which the theory of truth is formulated. (3) Avoiding the second shortcoming requires arbitrary choices among equally good candidates for “the” logical form of sentences and hence the designation of ‘true’ as applied to them

Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) · Epistemology · Equivalence (formal languages) · Linguistics · Logical conjunction · Logical consequence · Logical equivalence · Logical form · Pluralism (philosophy) · Property (philosophy) · Virtue · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education

  • Truth as none and many

    Open Access•Will Gamester•Synthese•2023

  • Truth

    Paul Horwich•Truth•1998

  • Truth as One and Many

    Michael Patrick Lynch•Truth as one and many•2009

  • Tarski's Theory of Truth

    Hartry Field•The Journal of Philosophy•1972

  • Minimalism

    Anil Gupta•Philosophical Perspectives•1993

Citations per year0.33
Citation span2023 - 2023 (1)
Highly citedNo

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