Contextualism, Hawthorne's Invariantism and Third-Person Cases
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10692313 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anthony Brueckner (University of California, Santa Barbara, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 219 |
| Pages | 315-318 |
| Publication date | 2005-04-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00400.x |
| OpenAlex | W2172153361 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
Keith DeRose discusses ‘third‐person cases’, which appear to raise problems for John Hawthorne's invariantist approach to knowledge‐attributions. I argue that there is a prima facie problem for invariantism stemming from third‐person cases that is even worse than DeRose's. Then I show that in the end, contrary to appearances, third‐person cases do not threaten invariantism
Attribution · Contextualism · Epistemology · First person · Linguistics · Prima facie · Third party · Third person · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2008 - 2023 (16) |
| Highly cited | No |