The Boundary Stones of Thought
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10692336 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Wigglesworth (0000-0002-7305-6844, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue | 266 |
| Pages | 219-221 |
| Publication date | 2017-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqv120 |
| OpenAlex | W2556267873 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
Debates over which logic is the correct logic, either generally or for a particular area of discourse, pose a distinctive problem. Any justification for a logical law should proceed via an argument, and that argument will likely appeal to the very logical law that is in question. The argument will then be circular, and most likely viciously so. Ian Rumfitt's The Boundary Stones of Thought shows how we can avoid this problem in order to rationally adjudicate between rival logics. Rumfitt's goal is specific. He does not propose a general framework to decide between rival logicians from any logical camps whatsoever. Rumfitt's concern is to defend classical logic from specific objections made by intuitionists. He also addresses challenges raised by quantum logic, but the main focus is on intuitionism. Though each objection is different in interesting ways, they all appeal to the idea that some statements are indeterminate in truth value. For this reason, Rumfitt argues that these objections do not target classical logic directly. Rather, they target classical semantics, specifically, the semantic clauses for negation and disjunction. Rumfitt's goal is to find common semantic ground that classical logicians and their rivals can agree on. By finding this common ground, Rumfitt argues that classical logic can answer the challenges posed by the intuitionist and quantum logicians.
Appeal · Argument (complex analysis) · Classical logic · Epistemology · Focus (optics) · Intuitionism · Linguistics · Logical consequence · Negation · Physics · Political science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2022 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |