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A Faithful Response to Disagreement

Bibliographic Data

ID10692426
AuthorsLara Buchak (0000-0002-0232-4274, Princeton University, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume130
Issue2
Pages191-226
Publication date2021-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-8809893
OpenAlexW3176391867
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited18

In the peer disagreement debate, three intuitively attractive claims seem to conflict: there is disagreement among peers on many important matters; peer disagreement is a serious challenge to one's own opinion; and yet one should be able to maintain one's opinion on important matters. This article shows that contrary to initial appearances, we can accept all three of these claims. Disagreement significantly shifts the balance of the evidence; but with respect to certain kinds of claims, one should nonetheless retain one's beliefs. And one should retain them even though these beliefs would not be supported by the new total evidence if one didn't already hold them

Balance (ability) · Economics · Epistemology · Positive economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology

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    Open Access•Lara Buchak•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2023

  • The Grounds of Political Legitimacy

    Fabienne Peters, Fabienne Peter•Grounds of Political Legitimacy•2023

  • Faith and traditions

    Open Access•Lara Buchak•Noûs•2023

  • Post-Enquiry and Disagreement. A Socio-Epistemological Model of the Normative Significance of Disagreement Between Scientists and Denialists

    Filippo Ferrari, Sebastiano Moruzzi•Social Epistemology•2023

  • In Defense of Robust Moral Encroachment

    Open Access•Alexandra Lloyd•Social Epistemology•2026

  • Belief, blame, and inquiry

    Open Access•Z Quanbeck•Philosophical Studies•2023

  • How to reason about religious beliefs

    Daniele Bertini•Dialogo•2021

  • No hope for conciliationism

    Open Access•Jonathan Dixon•Synthese•2024

  • Believing by Faith

    J Bishop•BELIEVING BY FAITH: AN ESSAY IN…•2007

  • Risk and Rationality

    Lara Buchak, Lara Marie Buchak•Risk and rationality•2013

  • Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence

    Thomas Kelly•Disagreement•2010

  • The Role of the Priority Rule in Science

    Michael Strevens, Inc Journal of Philosophy•The Journal of Philosophy•2003

  • Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes

    Open Access•I LAKATOS, И Лакатос•Criticism and the Growth of…•1970

  • Religious disagreement, externalism, and the epistemology of disagreement

    Open Access•James Kraft•Religious Studies•2007

  • The Division of Cognitive Labor

    Philip Kitcher•The Journal of Philosophy•1990

  • Probability amalgamation and the independence issue

    Open Access•Keith Lehrer, Carl Wagner•Synthese•1983

  • Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering

    Open Access•Lara Buchak•Philosophical Perspectives•2010

  • Epistemology of Disagreement

    David Christensen•The Philosophical Review•2007

  • Gambling with Truth

    Ronald N Giere, Isaac Levi•The Philosophical Review•1969

  • Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat

    Open Access•Maria Lasonen‐aarnio•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2014

  • Disagreement

    Open Access•Nathan L King, Nathan King•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2011

  • The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing

    Henry E Kyburg, Isaac Levi•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1994

  • On the Principle of Total Evidence

    I J Good•The British Journal for the…•1967

  • Diversity and the Division of Cognitive Labor

    Open Access•Ryan Muldoon•Philosophy Compass•2013

  • Disagreement as Evidence

    Open Access•David Christensen•Philosophy Compass•2009

Unique citing works8
Citations per year1,6
Citation span2021 - 2026 (6)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 7

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