Kneal's Argument Revisited
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10696494 |
|---|---|
| Authors | George Molnar (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1969 |
| Volume | 78 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 79 |
| Publication date | 1969-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2183813 |
| OpenAlex | W2333251118 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
THERE exists an argument by William Kneale to the conclusion that on a certain account of laws of nature we cannot say of some propositions that they express unrealized empirical possibilities, although this is just what we would normally take them to express. Kneale has advanced the argument in two places,' but has not bothered to state the matter rigorously or in full detail. Nor has his contention been discussed in the copious recent literature on the subject of laws, with one marginal exception.2 Considering the elegance and importance of the argument, this is surprising. In the first part of this article I shall essay a clear statement of what seems to be the essence of Kneale's argument. In doing so I am construing, rather than repeating, what he has said.3 In the second part I describe four formally adequate ways of escaping the conclusion of the argument. In the third part I discuss these ways out, offering reasons for preferring one of them
Analytic philosophy · Argument (complex analysis) · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,1 |
| Citation span | 1976 - 2012 (37) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |