Causation and Counterfactuals
Lewis' Treatment Reconsidered
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9687033 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alexander Rosenberg (0000-0003-2276-2412, Syracuse University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1979 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 209-219 |
| Publication date | 1979-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300048071 |
| OpenAlex | W2163164678 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 3 |
In this paper I bring together and discuss claims that David Lewis has made in Counterfactuals , and in “Causation,” and explore a number of difficulties which the views of these two works make for each other. If these difficulties are as serious as I suggest, they will require revision or rejection of the view of causation that Lewis defends
Causation · Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Economics · Epistemology · Positive economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |