The Explanatory Stopgap

Bibliographic Data

ID10696529
AuthorsEric Lormand (corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume113
Issue3
Pages303-357
Publication date2004-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-113-3-303
OpenAlexW2010030332
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited13

This requirement of conceptual (epistemological, a priori) necessitation is, intentionally, demanding in the extreme. Claim (i) is usually argued for by giving examples from science that seem to fulfill it. More generally, it seems to be motivated by the idea that explanation answers questions, and that a fully satisfying answer to a question should not raise a new question in its place. For example, a fully satisfying answer to the question, What is necessary and sufficient for consciousness [or life, water, rocks, and so on]? should not in turn raise the question, Why is that necessary and sufficient for consciousness [life, water, rocks]? And, it must be admitted, nothing closes off further questions quite like revealing them to presuppose conceptual contradictions. While I think there is much to be said against this stringent requirement on fully satisfactory explanation-both by arguing against the examples adduced in support of claim (i), and by arguing that questions may be rendered pointless without resting on conceptual contradictions-my aim in this article is to argue against (ii), and indeed to show in detail, step by conceptually necessary step, how to deduce phenomenal feels from purely nonphenomenal material

Epistemology · Explanatory model · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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