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Epistemic Consequentialism

Bibliographic Data

ID10696792
AuthorsKevin Dorst (0000-0003-3982-3242, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume129
Issue3
Pages484-489
Publication date2020-07-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-8311473
OpenAlexW4244507488
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited13

Book Review| July 01 2020 Epistemic Consequentialism Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer and Dunn, Jeffrey, eds., Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. vii + 335 pp. Kevin Dorst Kevin Dorst Massachusetts Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 484–489. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8311473 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter Email Permissions Search Site Citation Kevin Dorst; Epistemic Consequentialism. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2020; 129 (3): 484–489. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8311473 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search Epistemic consequentialism is the view that (at least some) features of epistemic rationality can be explained in terms of features of epistemic value. The standard framework is decision-theoretic: consider an agent who has a menu of doxastic options (credal-states, belief-states, or plans to update them) and a purely epistemic utility function (standardly, a measure of accuracy). What option should they choose to optimally promote epistemic utility?Epistemic consequentialism is a hot topic, for it offers a rare combination of (1) a fruitful, tractable framework that (appears to) provide insight into both old and new questions; and (2) apparently devastating problems that (threaten to) undermine any such insight. This combination has sustained a breakneck literature, with sympathizers claiming ever more insights, objectors claiming ever more problems, sympathizers offering ever more sophisticated responses to those problems, and so on.On the side of the sympathizers, we... © 2020 by Cornell University2020 You do not currently have access to this content

Citation · Consequentialism · Epistemology · Icon · Library science · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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    Richard Pettigrew•Accuracy and the Laws of Credence•2016

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  • Accuracy and Coherence

    Open Access•James M Joyce•Degrees of Belief•2009

  • Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy

    Open Access•Kevin Dorst•Mind•2019

  • The Division of Cognitive Labor

    Philip Kitcher•The Journal of Philosophy•1990

  • A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism

    Open Access•James M Joyce•Philosophy of Science•1998

  • Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters

    Open Access•Glauber De Bona, Julia Staffel•Philosophy of Science•2017

  • Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief

    Open Access•James Revell Carr•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2017

Citations per year0.06
Citation span2008 - 2008 (1)
Highly citedNo

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