Kevin Dorst
Biographic Data
| ID | 960713 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kevin Dorst |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kevin |
| FAMILY NAME | Dorst |
| SIGNATURE | DORST K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3982-3242 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 40 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Bayesians Commit the Gambler's Fallacy
The gambler's fallacy is the tendency to expect random processes to switch more often than they actually do—for example, to assign a higher probability to heads after a streak of tails. It's often taken to be evidence for irrationality. It isn't. Rather, it's to be expected from a group of Bayesians who begin with causal uncertainty, and then observe unbiased data from an (in fact) statistically independent process. Although they increase their c…
Reflection, introspection, and book
The much‐debated Reflection principle states that a coherent agent's credences must match their estimates for their future credences. Defenders claim that there are Dutch‐book arguments in its favor, putting it on the same normative footing as probabilistic coherence. Critics claim that those arguments rely on the implicit, implausible assumption that the agent is introspective : that they are certain what their own credences are. In this paper, …
The conjunction fallacy
The Conjunction Fallacy
The conjunction fallacy is the well-documented reasoning error on which people rate a conjunction A&B as more probable than one of its conjuncts, A. Many explanations appeal to the fact that B has a high probability in the given scenarios, but Tentori et al. (2013) have challenged such approaches. They report experiments suggesting that degree of confirmation—rather than probability—is the central determinant of the conjunction fallacy. In this p…
Rational Polarization
Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambigu…
Rational Polarization
Deference Done Better
There are many things—call them ‘experts'—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest : they're less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of deference break down: the most popular (“Reflection”‐style) principles collapse to inconsistency, while their most popular (“New‐Reflection”‐style) variants allow you to defer to someone while regarding them as…
Good Guesses
This paper is about guessing : how people respond to a question when they aren't certain of the answer. Guesses show surprising and systematic patterns that the most obvious theories don't explain. We argue that these patterns reveal that people aim to optimize a tradeoff between accuracy and informativity when forming their guess. After spelling out our theory, we use it to argue that guessing plays a central role in our cognitive lives. In part…
Epistemic Consequentialism
Book Review| July 01 2020 Epistemic Consequentialism Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer and Dunn, Jeffrey, eds., Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. vii + 335 pp. Kevin Dorst Kevin Dorst Massachusetts Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 484–489. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8311473 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter Email…
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy
The Lockean Thesis says that you must believe p iff you’re sufficiently confident of it. On some versions, the ‘must’ asserts a metaphysical connection; on others, it asserts a normative one. On some versions, ‘sufficiently confident’ refers to a fixed threshold of credence; on others, it varies with proposition and context. Claim: the Lockean Thesis follows from epistemic utility theory—the view that rational requirements are constrained by the …
Evidence
Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since you should take peer disagreement seriously, evidence must have two features. (1) It must sometimes warrant being modest : uncertain what your evidence warrants, and (thus) uncertain whether you’re rational. (2) But it must always warrant being guided : disposed to treat your evidence as a guide. It is surprisingly difficult to vindicate these dual c…
Evidence
Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since you should take peer disagreement seriously, evidence must have two features. (1) It must sometimes warrant being modest : uncertain what your evidence warrants, and (thus) uncertain whether you’re rational. (2) But it must always warrant being guided : disposed to treat your evidence as a guide. It is surprisingly difficult to vindicate these dual c…
Rational Polarization
Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambigu…
Good Guesses
This paper is about guessing : how people respond to a question when they aren't certain of the answer. Guesses show surprising and systematic patterns that the most obvious theories don't explain. We argue that these patterns reveal that people aim to optimize a tradeoff between accuracy and informativity when forming their guess. After spelling out our theory, we use it to argue that guessing plays a central role in our cognitive lives. In part…
Deference Done Better
There are many things—call them ‘experts'—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest : they're less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of deference break down: the most popular (“Reflection”‐style) principles collapse to inconsistency, while their most popular (“New‐Reflection”‐style) variants allow you to defer to someone while regarding them as…
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy
The Lockean Thesis says that you must believe p iff you’re sufficiently confident of it. On some versions, the ‘must’ asserts a metaphysical connection; on others, it asserts a normative one. On some versions, ‘sufficiently confident’ refers to a fixed threshold of credence; on others, it varies with proposition and context. Claim: the Lockean Thesis follows from epistemic utility theory—the view that rational requirements are constrained by the …
Evidence
Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since you should take peer disagreement seriously, evidence must have two features. (1) It must sometimes warrant being modest : uncertain what your evidence warrants, and (thus) uncertain whether you’re rational. (2) But it must always warrant being guided : disposed to treat your evidence as a guide. It is surprisingly difficult to vindicate these dual c…
Epistemic Consequentialism
Book Review| July 01 2020 Epistemic Consequentialism Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer and Dunn, Jeffrey, eds., Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. vii + 335 pp. Kevin Dorst Kevin Dorst Massachusetts Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 484–489. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8311473 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter Email…
Rational Polarization
Deference Done Better
There are many things—call them ‘experts'—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest : they're less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of deference break down: the most popular (“Reflection”‐style) principles collapse to inconsistency, while their most popular (“New‐Reflection”‐style) variants allow you to defer to someone while regarding them as…
Good Guesses
This paper is about guessing : how people respond to a question when they aren't certain of the answer. Guesses show surprising and systematic patterns that the most obvious theories don't explain. We argue that these patterns reveal that people aim to optimize a tradeoff between accuracy and informativity when forming their guess. After spelling out our theory, we use it to argue that guessing plays a central role in our cognitive lives. In part…
The Conjunction Fallacy
The conjunction fallacy is the well-documented reasoning error on which people rate a conjunction A&B as more probable than one of its conjuncts, A. Many explanations appeal to the fact that B has a high probability in the given scenarios, but Tentori et al. (2013) have challenged such approaches. They report experiments suggesting that degree of confirmation—rather than probability—is the central determinant of the conjunction fallacy. In this p…
Rational Polarization
Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambigu…
The conjunction fallacy
Reflection, introspection, and book
The much‐debated Reflection principle states that a coherent agent's credences must match their estimates for their future credences. Defenders claim that there are Dutch‐book arguments in its favor, putting it on the same normative footing as probabilistic coherence. Critics claim that those arguments rely on the implicit, implausible assumption that the agent is introspective : that they are certain what their own credences are. In this paper, …
Bayesians Commit the Gambler's Fallacy
The gambler's fallacy is the tendency to expect random processes to switch more often than they actually do—for example, to assign a higher probability to heads after a streak of tails. It's often taken to be evidence for irrationality. It isn't. Rather, it's to be expected from a group of Bayesians who begin with causal uncertainty, and then observe unbiased data from an (in fact) statistically independent process. Although they increase their c…
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Fallacy (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works)