The Case Against Events

Bibliographic Data

ID10696904
AuthorsTerence Horgan (corresponding author)
Year1978
Volume87
Issue1
Pages28
Publication date1978-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2184346
OpenAlexW2088405015
LanguageEN
Citations received12

THE concept of event has a prominent role in contemporary philosophy, because many important philosophical problems are often phrased with reference to events. For instance, the mind-body problem is often regarded nowadays as the problem of the relation between mental events and physical events; discussions of scientific explanation usually assume that the entities explained are events; causation is usually treated as a relation between events; determinism is usually taken to be the thesis that all events are causally necessitated; and actions, a species of event, are the very subjectmatter of action theory. It is not surprising, therefore, that philosophers have generally taken for granted that there are such things as events. We naturally tend to be tolerant of entities which seem to play such a prominent role in so many philosophical issues. But I contend that the concept of event is much less vital to the formulation of these issues-and to our conceptual scheme in general-than it first appears to be. Indeed, I shall argue that it is a mistake to posit events at all. My case will rest on an application of Occam's Razor. I will show that despite the initial appearances, there is no real theoretical need to postulate events. So, since their elimination yields an important simplification of ontology, we should banish them from existence

Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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