Terence Horgan
Biographic Data
| ID | 488650 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Terence Horgan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Terence |
| FAMILY NAME | Horgan |
| SIGNATURE | HORGAN T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Memphis |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 29 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 93 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 28 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1978 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Reflective intuition and the Copi card problem
In the 1970’s, a controversy arose about a probability problem posed by Irving Copi. One side argued that a common spontaneous intuition about the problem is correct; the other side argued that this intuition is mistaken. Here, I argue (1) that the naïve intuition yields the correct answer, but accidentally and for a wrong reason; (2) that a more reflective intuition yields a wrong answer, and hence, is also mistaken; and (3) that an even more re…
Evidentially embedded epistemic entitlement
Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim
The Synthetic Unity of Truth
This chapter articulates a version of correspondence theory that holds that truth is always correspondence. Separating questions about the nature of truth from questions about the correct ontology permits a metaphysically neutral position. When assertoric language is deployed in such a way that its singular terms and unnegated existential quantifications carry ontological commitment to particulars that putatively belong to the right ontology and …
Physicalism and its Discontents
Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published i…
The Perils of Epistemic Reductionism
1. Crispin Wright advocates generic conception of truth involving two key features. First, particular species of human discourse can involve genuine assertions, and can be apt for proper and correct application of truthpredicate, even if the right metaphysical construal of that discourse is antirealist rather than realist. Thus truth-aptness per se, as feature of given discourse (e.g., humor discourse, moral discourse, mathematical discourse, sci…
Kim on the Mind—Body Problem
For three decades the writings of Jaegwon Kim have had a major influence in philosophy of mind and in metaphysics. Sixteen of his philosophical papers, together with several new postscripts, are collected in Kim (1993). The publication of this collection prompts the present essay. After some preliminary remarks in the opening section, in Section 2 I will briefly describe Kim's philosophical 'big picture' about the relation between the mental and …
Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology
Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox
A nonclassical framework for cognitive science
From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World
TERENCE HORGAN; From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World, Mind, Volume 102, Issue 408, 1 October 1993, Pages 555–586, h
On What There Isn't
Peter van Inwagen's Material Beings is an excellent book. Van Inwagen defends with great skill and cogency the contention that the only real material beings are physical simples on one hand, and living organisms on the other. There is much to be learned from this book, whether one ultimately accepts its conclusions or not. And as an example of sustained philosophical argumentation, it is exemplary: the writing is lucid; the overall dialectical st…
Troubles on moral twin earth: Moral queerness revived
In defense of Southern Fundamentalism
Mental Quausation
Settling Into a New Paradigm
Science Nominalized Properly
Although Hale and Resnik are correct in their specific objection to my proposal for nominalizing science, the proposal can be saved by means of a simple and plausible modification
Supervenient Qualia
Hume and the Problem of Causation
Folk Psychology is Here to Stay
Folk psychology is a network of principles which constitutes a sort of common-sense theory about how to explain human behavior. These principles provide a central role to certain propositional attitudes, particularly beliefs and desires. The theory asserts, for example, that if someone desires that p, and this desire is not overridden by other desires, and he believes that an action of kind K will bring it about that p, and he believes that such …
Functionalism and token physicalism
Science Nominalized
I propose a way of formulating scientific laws and magnitude attributions which eliminates ontological commitment to mathematical entities. I argue that science only requires quantitative sentences as thus formulated, and hence that we ought to deny the existence of sets and numbers. I argue that my approach cannot plausibly be extended to the concrete “theoretical” entities of science
Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum
Functionalism is the doctrine that every mental state-type may be fully defined by means of its typical causal connections to sensory stimulation, behavior, and other mental state-types similarly defined. Some philosophers, myself included, believe that although functionalism is plausible as regards certain aspects of mentality, nevertheless there is one aspect that is incapable, in principle, of being analyzed functionally: viz., the qualitative…
Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia
Journal Article Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia Get access Terence Horgan Terence Horgan Memphis State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 34, Issue 135, April 1984, Pages 147–152, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219508 Published: 01 April 1984
Karl Popper
Troubles on moral twin earth: Moral queerness revived
Mental Quausation
Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox
Supervenient Qualia
Folk Psychology is Here to Stay
Folk psychology is a network of principles which constitutes a sort of common-sense theory about how to explain human behavior. These principles provide a central role to certain propositional attitudes, particularly beliefs and desires. The theory asserts, for example, that if someone desires that p, and this desire is not overridden by other desires, and he believes that an action of kind K will bring it about that p, and he believes that such …
Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia
Journal Article Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia Get access Terence Horgan Terence Horgan Memphis State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 34, Issue 135, April 1984, Pages 147–152, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219508 Published: 01 April 1984
The Case Against Events
THE concept of event has a prominent role in contemporary philosophy, because many important philosophical problems are often phrased with reference to events. For instance, the mind-body problem is often regarded nowadays as the problem of the relation between mental events and physical events; discussions of scientific explanation usually assume that the entities explained are events; causation is usually treated as a relation between events; d…
A nonclassical framework for cognitive science
Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum
Functionalism is the doctrine that every mental state-type may be fully defined by means of its typical causal connections to sensory stimulation, behavior, and other mental state-types similarly defined. Some philosophers, myself included, believe that although functionalism is plausible as regards certain aspects of mentality, nevertheless there is one aspect that is incapable, in principle, of being analyzed functionally: viz., the qualitative…
On What There Isn't
Peter van Inwagen's Material Beings is an excellent book. Van Inwagen defends with great skill and cogency the contention that the only real material beings are physical simples on one hand, and living organisms on the other. There is much to be learned from this book, whether one ultimately accepts its conclusions or not. And as an example of sustained philosophical argumentation, it is exemplary: the writing is lucid; the overall dialectical st…
Science Nominalized
I propose a way of formulating scientific laws and magnitude attributions which eliminates ontological commitment to mathematical entities. I argue that science only requires quantitative sentences as thus formulated, and hence that we ought to deny the existence of sets and numbers. I argue that my approach cannot plausibly be extended to the concrete “theoretical” entities of science
Kim on the Mind—Body Problem
For three decades the writings of Jaegwon Kim have had a major influence in philosophy of mind and in metaphysics. Sixteen of his philosophical papers, together with several new postscripts, are collected in Kim (1993). The publication of this collection prompts the present essay. After some preliminary remarks in the opening section, in Section 2 I will briefly describe Kim's philosophical 'big picture' about the relation between the mental and …
Settling Into a New Paradigm
Token physicalism, supervenience, and the generality of physics
Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology
Supervenient Bridge Laws
I invoke the conceptual machinery of contemporary possible-world semantics to provide an account of the metaphysical status of “bridge laws” in intertheoretic reductions. I argue that although bridge laws are not definitions, and although they do not necessarily reflect attribute-identities, they are supervenient. I.e., they are true in all possible worlds in which the reducing theory is true
The Case Against Events
THE concept of event has a prominent role in contemporary philosophy, because many important philosophical problems are often phrased with reference to events. For instance, the mind-body problem is often regarded nowadays as the problem of the relation between mental events and physical events; discussions of scientific explanation usually assume that the entities explained are events; causation is usually treated as a relation between events; d…
Action Theory and Social Science: Some Formal Models
Token physicalism, supervenience, and the generality of physics
Karl Popper
Functionalism and token physicalism
Science Nominalized
I propose a way of formulating scientific laws and magnitude attributions which eliminates ontological commitment to mathematical entities. I argue that science only requires quantitative sentences as thus formulated, and hence that we ought to deny the existence of sets and numbers. I argue that my approach cannot plausibly be extended to the concrete “theoretical” entities of science
Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum
Functionalism is the doctrine that every mental state-type may be fully defined by means of its typical causal connections to sensory stimulation, behavior, and other mental state-types similarly defined. Some philosophers, myself included, believe that although functionalism is plausible as regards certain aspects of mentality, nevertheless there is one aspect that is incapable, in principle, of being analyzed functionally: viz., the qualitative…
Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia
Journal Article Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia Get access Terence Horgan Terence Horgan Memphis State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 34, Issue 135, April 1984, Pages 147–152, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219508 Published: 01 April 1984
Hume and the Problem of Causation
Folk Psychology is Here to Stay
Folk psychology is a network of principles which constitutes a sort of common-sense theory about how to explain human behavior. These principles provide a central role to certain propositional attitudes, particularly beliefs and desires. The theory asserts, for example, that if someone desires that p, and this desire is not overridden by other desires, and he believes that an action of kind K will bring it about that p, and he believes that such …
Science Nominalized Properly
Although Hale and Resnik are correct in their specific objection to my proposal for nominalizing science, the proposal can be saved by means of a simple and plausible modification
Supervenient Qualia
Settling Into a New Paradigm
Mental Quausation
In defense of Southern Fundamentalism
Troubles on moral twin earth: Moral queerness revived
From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World
TERENCE HORGAN; From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World, Mind, Volume 102, Issue 408, 1 October 1993, Pages 555–586, h
On What There Isn't
Peter van Inwagen's Material Beings is an excellent book. Van Inwagen defends with great skill and cogency the contention that the only real material beings are physical simples on one hand, and living organisms on the other. There is much to be learned from this book, whether one ultimately accepts its conclusions or not. And as an example of sustained philosophical argumentation, it is exemplary: the writing is lucid; the overall dialectical st…
Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox
A nonclassical framework for cognitive science
Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology
The Perils of Epistemic Reductionism
1. Crispin Wright advocates generic conception of truth involving two key features. First, particular species of human discourse can involve genuine assertions, and can be apt for proper and correct application of truthpredicate, even if the right metaphysical construal of that discourse is antirealist rather than realist. Thus truth-aptness per se, as feature of given discourse (e.g., humor discourse, moral discourse, mathematical discourse, sci…
Kim on the Mind—Body Problem
For three decades the writings of Jaegwon Kim have had a major influence in philosophy of mind and in metaphysics. Sixteen of his philosophical papers, together with several new postscripts, are collected in Kim (1993). The publication of this collection prompts the present essay. After some preliminary remarks in the opening section, in Section 2 I will briefly describe Kim's philosophical 'big picture' about the relation between the mental and …
Physicalism and its Discontents
Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published i…
Philosophy (28 works) · Epistemology (27 works) · Metaphysics (12 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (12 works) · Psychology (10 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (8 works) · Contemporary philosophy (7 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Consciousness (5 works)