Reflective intuition and the Copi card problem

Bibliographic Data

ID21591714
AuthorsTerence Horgan (University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume34
Issue3
Pages327-344
Publication date2021-04-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2020.1849598
OpenAlexW3111189600
LanguageEN
References cited15

In the 1970’s, a controversy arose about a probability problem posed by Irving Copi. One side argued that a common spontaneous intuition about the problem is correct; the other side argued that this intuition is mistaken. Here, I argue (1) that the naïve intuition yields the correct answer, but accidentally and for a wrong reason; (2) that a more reflective intuition yields a wrong answer, and hence, is also mistaken; and (3) that an even more reflective intuition yields the correct answer for a correct reason. This warrants what I call optimistic fallibilism concerning intuitions about probability: although intuition is certainly prone to error in this domain, intuition has the capacity for self-correction. A naïve intuition that is mistaken can be replaced by a distinct, reflective intuition; and a reflective intuition that is mistaken can be replaced by another reflective intuition – with the process ultimately yielding a sound intuition

Epistemology · Intuition · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Philosophy · Probability and Statistical Research · Psychology

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