Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle

Bibliographic Data

ID10696992
AuthorsJames Van Cleve (0000-0002-8627-8075, corresponding author)
Year1979
Volume88
Issue1
Pages55
Publication date1979-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2184779
OpenAlexW1975665122
LanguageEN
Citations received28

T HE problem of the Cartesian Circle is sometimes treated as though it were merely an exercise for scholars: Descartes fell into it, and theirjob is to get him out of it. But more is at stake than extricating Descartes. In its generalized form, the Cartesian Circle is none other than the Problem of the Criterion, a problem that any epistemology must face. Moreover, to solve the problem of the Circle one must answer questions about epistemic principles that are pivotal in contemporary debates between foundationalists and coherentists. There is reason to hope, therefore, that by examining Descartes's problem we can throw light on problems of our own. This paper is divided into two parts. In Part One I examine solutions to the problem of the Circle that are possible within Descartes's own framework. In Part Two I show how what we learn in Part One may be used to resolve some contemporary disputes that hinge on the status of epistemic principles

Analytic philosophy · Cartesian coordinate system · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Foundationalism · Geometry · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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