Belief and Indeterminacy

Bibliographic Data

ID10698707
AuthorsMichael Caie (corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume121
Issue1
Pages1-54
Publication date2012-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-1426355
OpenAlexW2094609421
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited21

An attractive approach to the semantic paradoxes holds that cases of semantic pathology give rise to indeterminacy. What attitude should a rational agent have toward a proposition that it takes to be indeterminate in this sense? Orthodoxy holds that rationality requires that an agent disbelieve such a proposition. I argue that a rational agent should be such that it is indeterminate whether it believes the proposition in question. For rational agents, indeterminacy in the objects of their attitudes will filter up to the attitudes themselves

Economics · Epistemology · Indeterminacy (philosophy) · Indeterminate · Neoclassical economics · Orthodoxy · Proposition · Pure mathematics · Rational agent · Rationality · Theology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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