The Paradox of Ideal Evidence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10700888 |
|---|---|
| Authors | R H Vincent (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1962 |
| Volume | 71 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 497 |
| Publication date | 1962-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2183462 |
| OpenAlex | W2330225369 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
K R. POPPER has recently said that is a mistake to think that probability may be interpreted as a measure of rationality of our beliefs (this interpretation is excluded by paradox of perfect evidence).' And again, Considerations of 'the weight of evidence' lead, within subjective theory of probability, to paradoxes which, in my opinion, are insoluble within framework of this theory.2 Popper explains one of these paradoxes and calls it the paradox of ideal evidence. I shall discuss this paradox, for I think that it is no paradox at all and so taken by itself provides no good reason for rejecting subjective theory of probability. What is subjective theory of probability? Consider equation
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Ideal (ethics) · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
| Citations per year | 0.03 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1992 - 1992 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |