Keynes's Weight of Argument and Popper's Paradox of Ideal Evidence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10707338 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rod O'Donnell, Rod O’donnell (0000-0002-4805-3350, Macquarie University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 44-52 |
| Publication date | 1992-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/289653 |
| OpenAlex | W1973260261 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 1 |
Popper's paradox of ideal evidence has long been viewed as a telling criticism of Keynes's logical theory of probability and its associated concept of the weight of argument. This paper shows that a simple addition to Keynes's definitions of irrelevance enables his theory to elude the paradox with ease. The modified definition draws on ideas already present in Keynes's Treatise on Probability (1973). As a consequence, relevant evidence and the weight of argument may increase, even when new evidence leaves the probability unaltered
Argument (complex analysis) · Criticism · Economics · Empirical evidence · Epistemology · Ideal (ethics) · Karl popper · Mathematical economics · Positive economics · Simple (philosophy) · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |