In Defense of Convergent Realism

Bibliographic Data

ID10705396
AuthorsChris L Hardin (0000-0003-0175-4640, Syracuse University), Clyde L Hardin, Alexander Rosenberg (0000-0003-2276-2412, Syracuse University)
Year1982
Volume49
Issue4
Pages604-615
Publication date1982-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/289080
OpenAlexW2003342132
LanguageEN
Citations received48
References cited3

Many realists have maintained that the success of scientific theories can be explained only if they may be regarded as approximately true. Laurens Laudan has in turn contended that a necessary condition for a theory's being approximately true is that its central terms refer, and since many successful theories of the past have employed central terms which we now understand to be non-referential, realism cannot explain their success. The present paper argues that a realist can adopt a view of reference according to which a theory might plausibly be said to be approximately true even though its central terms do not refer, or alternatively, he may construe reference in such a way as to assign reference to a range of successful older theories which includes Laudan's purported counterexamples

Counterexample · Epistemology · Proposition · Range (aeronautics) · Realism · Scientific realism · Scientific theory · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Science and Climate Studies

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