Can the Pessimistic Induction be Saved from Semantic Anti-Realism about Scientific Theory
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8399398 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Greg Frost-Arnold, Greg Frost‐Arnold (0000-0003-3645-4023, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 65 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 521-548 |
| Publication date | 2014-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axt013 |
| OpenAlex | W2099536347 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 42 |
Scientific anti-realists who appeal to the pessimistic induction (PI) claim that the theoretical terms of past scientific theories often fail to refer to anything. But on standard views in philosophy of language, such reference failures prima facie lead to certain sentences being neither true nor false. Thus, if these standard views are correct, then the conclusion of the PI should be that significant chunks of current theories are truth-valueless. But that is semantic anti-realism about scientific discourse—a position most philosophers of science, anti-realists included, consider anathema today. Therefore, proponents of the PI confront a dilemma: either accept semantic anti-realism or reject common semantic views. I examine strategies (with particular emphasis on supervaluations) for the PI proponent to either lessen the sting of this argument, or learn to live with it. 1 Introduction 2 Designation Failure 2.1 Designation failure leads to truth-valueless sentences 2.1.1 Direct reference theory 2.1.2 Fregeanism 2.1.3 Accounts of reference-fixing: why ‘phlogiston’ fails to designate 2.2 Objection: sentences exhibiting designation failure are false not truth-valueless 2.3 Avoiding truth-valuelessness via controversial semantic positions 3 What to do? Closing the Gaps 4 Conclusion
Argument (complex analysis) · Dilemma · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Pessimism · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Prima facie · Quine · Realism · Scientific realism · Scientific theory · Chemistry · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Beyond Rigidity
Exceeding Our Grasp
Scientific Realism
How to Define Theoretical Terms
Theory Change and The Indterminacy of Reference
Naming and Necessity
The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell
Semantics in Generative Grammar
Vagueness, truth and logic
Naming Natural Kinds
Realism bit by bit
Scientific realism bit by bit
Fixing the Reference of Theoretical Terms
Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy
In Defense of Convergent Realism
The Instrumentalist's New Clothes
From the Pessimistic Induction to Semantic Antirealism
Theory-Dependent Terms
A Confutation of Convergent Realism
Speaking of Nothing
Theories, Theorists and Theoretical Change
Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude
Incommensurability, Translation and Understanding
The Advancement of Science
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,67 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2025 (9) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |