Functionalism, Reductionism, and Levels of Reality

Bibliographic Data

ID10705473
AuthorsLorenzo Lorenzetti (0000-0003-1565-283X, University of Bristol, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume90
Issue4
Pages922-936
Publication date2023-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/psa.2023.4
OpenAlexW4321253254
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited24

I consider a problem for functional reductionism based on the following tension. Say that b is functionally reduced to a . On one hand, a and b turn out to be identical, and identity is a symmetric relation. On the other hand, functional reductionism implies that a and b are asymmetrically related: if b is functionally reduced to a , then a is not functionally reduced to b . Thus we ask, how can a and b be asymmetrically related if they are the same thing? I propose a solution to this tension by distinguishing between ontological levels and levels of description

Epistemology · Functionalism (philosophy of mind) · Identity (music) · Reductionism · Relation (database) · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access