When Probabilistic Support is Inductive
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10706161 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alberto Mura (0000-0001-8922-4729, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 278-289 |
| Publication date | 1990-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/289548 |
| OpenAlex | W1996495810 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 19 |
This note makes a contribution to the issue raised in a paper by Popper and Miller (1983) in which it was claimed that probabilistic support is purely deductive. Developing R. C. Jeffrey's remarks, a new general approach to the crucial concept of “going beyond” is here proposed. By means of it a quantitative measure of the inductive component of a probabilistic inference is reached. This proposal leads to vindicating the view that typical predictive probabilistic inferences by enumeration and analogy are purely inductive
Analogy · Component (thermodynamics) · Epistemology · Inductive reasoning · Inference · Mathematical economics · Probabilistic logic · Artificial Intelligence · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,16 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2009 (16) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |