Contentious Contents
For Inductive Probability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8399112 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Elby (0000-0002-1965-8406, University of California, Berkeley, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 193-200 |
| Publication date | 1994-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/45.1.193 |
| OpenAlex | W2074280322 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 6 |
According to Popper and Miller [1983 and 1987], the part of a hypothesis that transcends the evidence is probablistically countersupported by the evidence. Therefore, inductive support is not probabilistic support. Their argument hinges on imposing the following necessary condition on ‘the part of a hypothesis h that goes beyond the evidence e’: that transcendent part, called k, must share no nontrivial consequences with e.I propose a new condition on k that is incompatible with Popper and Miller's condition. I then show why the new condition is a viable alternative to Popper and Miller's. By doing so, I refute their argument that probabilistic support cannot be inductive.
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Inductive reasoning · Mathematical economics · Miller · Probabilistic logic · Computer Science · Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |