How to Fix Kind Membership

A Problem for HPC Theory and a Solution

Bibliographic Data

ID10706287
AuthorsThomas A C Reydon (0000-0002-1804-0532, Leibniz University of Applied Sciences, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume76
Issue5
Pages724-736
Publication date2009-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/605814
OpenAlexW2146131288
LanguageEN
Citations received10
References cited16

Natural kinds are often contrasted with other kinds of scientific kinds, especially functional kinds, because of a presumed categorical difference in explanatory value: supposedly, natural kinds can ground explanations, while other kinds of kinds cannot. I argue against this view of natural kinds by examining a particular type of explanation—mechanistic explanation—and showing that functional kinds do the same work there as traditionally recognized natural kinds are supposed to do in “standard” scientific explanations. Breaking down this categorical distinction between traditional natural kinds and other kinds of kinds, I argue, delivers two goods: It provides us with a view of natural kindhood that does justice to the epistemic roles of kinds in scientific explanations. And it allows us to solve a problem that HPC theory, currently one of the more popular accounts of natural kindhood, confronts

Categorical variable · Epistemology · Natural (archaeology) · Natural kind · Natural science · Scientific theory · Sociology · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · History · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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