Scientific realism with historical essences

The case of species

Bibliographic Data

ID10811900
AuthorsMarion Godman (0000-0002-7728-0720, University of Cambridge, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume198
IssueS12
Pages3041-3057
Publication date2021-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSynthese (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-018-02034-3
OpenAlexW2903952479
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited54

Natural kinds, real kinds, or, following J.S. Mill simply, Kinds , are thought to be an important asset for scientific realists in the non-fundamental (or “special”) sciences. Essential natures are less in vogue. I show that the realist would do well to couple her Kinds with essential natures in order to strengthen their epistemic and ontological credentials. I argue that these essential natures need not however be intrinsic to the Kind’s members; they may be historical. I concentrate on assessing the merits of historical essential natures in a paradigm case of Kinds in the non-fundamental sciences: species. I specify two basic jobs for essential natures: (1) offering individuation criteria, and (2) providing a causal explanation of the Kind’s multiple projectable properties. I argue that at least in the case of species historical essences are fit for both tasks. The principled resistance to Kinds with historical essences should also be cleared

Causation · Clearance · Epistemology · Individuation · Metaphysics · Order (exchange) · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Realism · Scientific realism · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

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