Theory Choice and Resistance to Change

Bibliographic Data

ID10706366
AuthorsAndrew Lugg (0000-0003-2940-5661, University of Ottawa, corresponding author)
Year1980
Volume47
Issue2
Pages227-243
Publication date1980-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/288930
OpenAlexW2050500275
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited27

The object of this paper is twofold: to show that resistance to scientific change on the part of scientists need signal neither irrationality nor the presence of extra-scientific influences; and to show how such resistance can be accommodated within a theory of rational choice. After considerations have been outlined suggesting that scientists cannot rationally resist new scientific theories unless theory choice is subjectivistic (section I), evidence is adduced favoring the contrary view (section II). In section III, a non-subjectivistic, non-relativistic conception of rational choice is proposed which recognizes the possibility of scientists' rationally resisting new scientific developments. Finally, in section IV, some minor misunderstandings concerning resistance are discussed

Biology · Economics · Epistemology · Irrationality · Object (grammar) · Positive economics · Rationality · Resistance (ecology) · Scientific theory · Section (typography) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science

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