Empirical Psychology, Naturalized Epistemology, and First Philosophy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10706754 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Harvey Siegel (0000-0001-5398-3395, University of Miami, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1984 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 667-676 |
| Publication date | 1984-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/289211 |
| OpenAlex | W2055336098 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 4 |
In his 1983 article, Paul A. Roth defends the Quinean project of naturalized epistemology from the criticism presented in my 1980 article. In this note I would like to respond to Roth's effort. I will argue that, while helpful in advancing and clarifying the issues, Roth's defense of naturalized epistemology does not succeed. The primary topic to be clarified is Quine's “no first philosophy” doctrine; but I will address myself to other points as well
Criticism · Doctrine · Epistemology · Epistemology of Wikipedia · Formal epistemology · Quine · Social epistemology · Theology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
| Citations per year | 0.22 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1990 - 2002 (13) |
| Highly cited | No |