Siegel on Naturalized Epistemology and Natural Science
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10708188 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul A Roth (0000-0002-9531-4365, University of Missouri–St. Louis, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1983 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 482-493 |
| Publication date | 1983-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/289131 |
| OpenAlex | W2021039480 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 5 |
What is the relation of epistemology, understood as the study of the evaluation of knowledge claims, and empirical psychology, understood as the study of the causal generation of a person's beliefs? Quine maintains that the relation is one of “mutual containment”. Epistemology in its new setting, conversely, is contained in natural science, as a chapter of psychology. ... We are studying how the human subject of our study posits bodies and projects his physics from his data, and we appreciate that our position in the world is just like his. Our very epistemological enterprise, therefore, and the psychology wherein it is a component chapter, and the whole of natural science wherein psychology is a component book—all this is our own construction or projection from stimulations like those we were meting out to our epistemological subject. There is thus reciprocal containment, though containment in different senses: epistemology in natural science and natural science in epistemology (Quine 1969, p. 83)
Empirical psychology · Epistemology · Epistemology of Wikipedia · Formal epistemology · Natural (archaeology) · Natural science · Philosophy of psychology · Philosophy of science · Quine · Reciprocal · Relation (database) · Social epistemology · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Social Representations and Identity
| Citations per year | 0.05 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1984 - 1991 (8) |
| Highly cited | No |