On Accuracy and Coherence with Infinite Opinion Sets

Bibliographic Data

ID10707902
AuthorsM Kelley (0000-0001-5131-0525, Stanford University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume90
Issue1
Pages92-128
Publication date2023-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/psa.2021.37
OpenAlexW3045792508
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited12

There is a well-known equivalence between avoiding accuracy dominance and having probabilistically coherent credences (see, e.g., de Finetti 1974; Joyce 2009; Predd et al. 2009; Pettigrew 2016). However, this equivalence has been established only when the set of propositions on which credence functions are defined is finite. In this article, I establish connections between accuracy dominance and coherence when credence functions are defined on an infinite set of propositions. In particular, I establish the necessary results to extend the classic accuracy argument for probabilism to certain classes of infinite sets of propositions, including countably infinite partitions

Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) · Credence · Discrete mathematics · Dominance (genetics) · Equivalence (formal languages) · Mathematical economics · Set (abstract data type) · Statistics · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics

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