Probability and evidence
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6570334 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Paul Horwich |
| Año | 2016 |
| Páginas | 136 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2016-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | BOOK |
| Revista | Probability and evidence (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Open Library | OL27224278M |
| ISBN | 9781107142107 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 112 |
A vueltas con la duda razonable y la lógica difusa
The Paradox of Confirmation1
Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation
Evidence
The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic
Can there be a burden of the best explanation
A Bayesian perspective on severity
Against Securitism, the New Breed of Actualism in Consequentialist Thought
A. J. Ayer
Psychological conceptions of randomness
Randomized Controlled Trials
Belief revision in the service of scientific discovery
Do “Tratado sobre Probabilidade” à “Teoria Geral”
Novel prediction and the problem of low-quality accommodation
Accuracy and infinity
Bolstering superficial measurement robustness with community-based data foundations
God, Probability and John Hick
What Makes Something Surprising
Evidence and Normativity
Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing
Four Problems About Self-Locating Belief
Another Look at Reasoning Experiments
Justifying Conditionalization
Cognitive Science
Dissolving Rationality
The Indispensability of Mathematics
Category-based induction.
A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.
Accuracy and Coherence
Janina Hosiasson and the value of evidence
Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons
Randomness and the Justification of Induction
What Accuracy Could Not Be
On the Necessity for Random Sampling
Confirmation, Heuristics, and Explanatory Reasoning
Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–Pearson Philosophy of Induction
How the Social Environment Shaped the Evolution of Mind
Random Emeralds
Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning
New Axioms for Probability and Likelihood Ratio Measures
Solving the Tacking Problem with Contrast Classes
Why Scientists Gather Evidence
Confirmation in a Branching World
A Bayesian Paradox
Theories of Probability
The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses
Confirming Mathematical Theories
Hempel's Raven Paradox
Corroborating Testimony, Probability and Surprise
Some Problems for Bayesian Confirmation Theory
The Context of Prediction (and the Paradox of Confirmation)
The Rational Analysis Of Mind And Behavior
Confirmation, Paradoxes, and Possible Worlds
Curve-Fitting for Bayesians
Avoiding Epistemic Hell
Prediction Versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting
Credibility, Confirmation and Explanation
Variation and the Accuracy of Predictions
Explanation, Causation and Laws
A false dichotomy in denying explanatoriness any role in confirmation
Evil and the god of indifference
The Probabilistic Nature of Objective Consequentialism
Harking
Realism versus anti-realism
In defense of modest probabilism
Belief attribution in science
How can necessary facts call for explanation
Probabilistic measures of coherence
The variety of evidence thesis and its independence of degrees of independence
J. M. Keynes's position on the general applicability of mathematical, logical and statistical methods in economics and social science
Acceptibility, Evidence, and Severity
On Russell's principle of induction
Synthetic a priori judgments and Kant’s response to Hume on induction
Irrelevant conjunction and the ratio measure or historical skepticism
Regularity theories disconfirmed
Experimental effects and causal representations
Bayesian representation of a prolonged archaeological debate
On the role of explanatory and systematic power in scientific reasoning
Is epistemic anxiety an intellectual virtue
Evidence amalgamation in the sciences
Can the skepticism debate be resolved
Probability and proximity in surprise
Epistemic values and the value of learning
Explaining coincidences
Scientific innovation and the limits of social scientific prediction
On the laws of nature
Urning a Resolution of Hempel's Paradox
A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens
The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux
Bayesianism and the Value of Diverse Evidence
On Accuracy and Coherence with Infinite Opinion Sets
The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity
Error Statistics and Learning From Error
Bayesian Networks and the Problem of Unreliable Instruments
Wayne, Horwich, and Evidential Diversity
The Confirmation of Quantitative Laws
Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence
On Bayesian Measures of Evidential Support
Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox
A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications
| Obras citantes distintas | 112 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 2,29 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1977 - 2025 (49) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | Sí |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 90 |