Ignorance in Congressional Voting? Evidence from Policy Reversal on the Endangered Species Act
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10765123 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Edward J Lopez (University of North Texas), Daniel Sutter (University of Oklahoma) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 85 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 891-912 |
| Publication date | 2004-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Science Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0038-4941 • E-ISSN: 1540-6237 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0038-4941.2004.00250.x |
| OpenAlex | W2158038225 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 18 |
Objective. In 1978 Congress weakened several key provisions of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which had been enacted only five years earlier. The objective is to compare alternative explanations for this policy reversal. Methods. Probit and multinomial logit models are used to explain empirically how senators voted in both 1973 and 1978, and to investigate why many senators switched their vote from supporting ESA to weakening it. Results. The findings here indicate that party affiliation and policy‐maker preferences were not important to the 1973 vote, but they were key variables in the 1978 votes and the vote‐switching decision. Proxies for unexpected economic impacts of ESA on individual states have little explanatory power. Conclusions. Ignorance, as measured here, does not appear to explain this policy reversal; rather, an influx of relatively conservative Democrats between 1973 and 1978 presents itself as the leading explanation
Biology · Econometrics · Economics · Endangered species · Explanatory power · Ignorance · Key (lock) · Logit · Multinomial logistic regression · Multinomial probit · Political science · Politics · Population · Positive economics · Probit · Probit model · Public economics · Sociology · Voting · Demography · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
The Rationality of Ideology
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective
Legislator voting and shirking
Non-optimal unanimous agreement
The Unanimous Voting Rule is not the Political Equivalent to Market Exchange
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
On the (mis)measurement of legislator ideology and shirking
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,18 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2021 (13) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |