Non-optimal unanimous agreement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10932345 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Randall G Holcombe (0000-0002-7038-0999, Auburn University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1986 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 229-244 |
| Publication date | 1986-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Public Choice (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-5829 • E-ISSN: 1573-7101 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/bf00051620 |
| OpenAlex | W1976091867 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 28 |
Agreement · Economics · Linguistics · Macroeconomics · Political science · Public finance · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy
Cartels, coalitions, and constitutional politics
Non-optimal unanimous agreement under majority rule
Less than unanimous agreement on the reason for unanimous agreement
The Unanimous Voting Rule is not the Political Equivalent to Market Exchange
The stability of international coalitions in United Nations voting from 1946 to 1973
James M. Buchanan’s constitutional project
The regulation of lobbyists
Ignorance in Congressional Voting? Evidence from Policy Reversal on the Endangered Species Act
The general theory of employment, interest, and money
The theory of political coalitions.
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
An economic theory of democracy
The Calculus of Consent
Social Choice and Individual Values
A note on a cyclical majority problem
Why so much stability
When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
On the distribution of federal taxes and expenditures, and the new war between the states
Centralized vote-trading
On the Structure and Stability of Political Markets
An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs
Politics, Policy, and the Pigovian Margins
A Research Note on the Size of Winning Coalitions
The Instability of Minimum Winning Coalitions
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,22 |
| Citation span | 1989 - 2020 (32) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |