Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10803558 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James P Farwell (corresponding author), Rafal Rohozinski |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 23-40 |
| Publication date | 2011-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Survival (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-6338 • E-ISSN: 1468-2699 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00396338.2011.555586 |
| OpenAlex | W1972757409 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 54 |
| References cited | 3 |
The discovery in June 2010 that a cyber worm dubbed ‘Stuxnet’ had struck the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz suggested that, for cyber war, the future is now. Yet more important is the political and strategic context in which new cyber threats are emerging, and the effects the worm has generated in this respect. Perhaps most striking is the confluence between cyber crime and state action. States are capitalising on technology whose development is driven by cyber crime, and perhaps outsourcing cyber attacks to non-attributable third parties, including criminal organisations. Cyber offers great potential for striking at enemies with less risk than using traditional military means. It is unclear how much the Stuxnet program cost, but it was almost certainly less than the cost of single fighter-bomber. Yet if damage from cyber attacks can be quickly repaired, careful strategic thought is required in comparing the cost and benefits of cyber versus traditional military attack. One important benefit of cyber attack may be its greater opportunity to achieve goals such as retarding the Iranian nuclear programme without causing the loss of life or injury to innocent civilians that air strikes would seem more likely to inflict. Nevertheless, cyber attacks do carry a risk of collateral damage, with a risk of political blowback if the attacking parties are identified. Difficulty in identifying a cyber attacker presents multiple headaches for responding. A key strategic risk in cyber attack, finally, lies in potential escalatory responses. Strategies for using cyber weapons like Stuxnet need to take into account that adversaries may attempt to turn them back against us
Action (physics · Business · Collateral damage · Computer security · Context (archaeology · Criminology · Cyber threats · Cyber-attack · Cyberwarfare · Internet privacy · Computer Science · Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies · Information and Cyber Security
World Politics at the Edge of Chaos
Für eine multitemporale Bestimmung von Cybersicherheit
Politik in der digitalen Gesellschaft
Dark Sides of Social Networking
Terrorism Online
From Cyber-Bombs to Political Fallout
Israel and Cyberspace
Rethinking Secrecy in Cyberspace
Cyber Shadows over Nuclear Peace
Optimal Cyber-Insurance Contract Design for Dynamic Risk Management and Mitigation
Passive and active training approaches for critical infrastructure protection
Cyber-Intervention Unit Against Genocide
An Ethical Framework for Hacking Operations
Cyber intelligence and international security
CyberWar Game
Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies
Warfighting for Cyber Deterrence
The Distinct Wrong of Deepfakes
The materiality of cyberthreats
Evolving Toward a Balanced Cyber Strategy in East Asia
Cybersecurity Research Meets Science and Technology Studies
The ontological politics of cyber security
A theory of actor-network for cyber-security
Inn i gråsonen
Catalysts of Cyber Threats on the Example of Visegrad Group Countries
Great Power Cyberpolitics and Global Cyberhegemony
Cyberwar
The “Attribution Problem” and the Social Construction of “Violence”
Cyber-attacks and psychological IR perspectives
Intelligence in the Cyber Era
Cyberweapons
Relational geographies of cyberterrorism and cyberwar
Assembling cybersecurity
Cyber security meets security politics
Saving face in the cyberspace
A fragile public preference for cyber strikes
The Cyberterrorism Threat
What lurks beneath the tip of the iceberg? Exploring the “missingness” problem in cyber events data
Strategic studies and cyber warfare
The covert campaign against Iran’s nuclear program
On the asymmetric advantages of cyberwarfare. Western literature and the Chinese journal Guofang Keji
Cumulative Deterrence’ as a New Paradigm for Cyber Deterrence
US cyber deterrence
Stuxnet revisited
Cyber campaigns and strategic outcomes
A Ciberguerra É Moderna! Uma Investigação sobre a Relação entre Tecnologia e Modernização na Guerra
A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice
The Future of Cyber-Resilience in an Age of Global Complexity
The Politics of Attributing Blame for Cyberattacks and the Costs of Uncertainty
The Likelihood of Cyberwar between the United States and China
Limits to a cyber-threat
The everywhere war
The dynamics of cyber conflict between rival antagonists, 2001-11
Structural Sources of Saudi-Iran Rivalry and Competition for the Sphere of Influence
| Unique citing works | 54 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3.6 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2026 (16) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 51 |